Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2003

Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen on behalf
of themselves and all other similarly situated
taxpayers, Plaintiffs, Appellants, vs. The Utah State
Tax Commsision, Pam Hendrickson, R. Bruce
Johnson, Palmer DePaulis, and Marc B. Johnson, as
Commissioners of the Utah State Tax Commission
and the Utah State Retirement System, Defendants
and Appellees : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John C. McCarrey; Timothy A. Bodily; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark L. Shurtelff; Attorney
General; Attorneys for Appellees.
Gary A. Dodge; Kevin W. Bates; Hatch, James & Dodge; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Thompson v. Utah State Tax Commsision, No. 20030506.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2411

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Richard C. Thompson and Paul C.
Jensen on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated taxpayers,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 20030506-SC

The Utah State Tax Commission, Pam
Hendrickson, R. Bruce Johnson, Palmer
DePaulis, and Marc B. Johnson, as
Commissioners of the Utah State Tax
Commission and the Utah State
Retirement System,

www r

$<**\

)

UTAH i>urncivi£ COU

JAN 2 3 2004
Defendants and Appellees.

-iOLOMrV

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING
John C. McCarrey, Esq.
Timothy A. Bodily, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff, Esq.
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140874
Attorneys for Appellees,
Utah State Tax Commission,
Pam Hendrickson, R. Bruce
Johnson Palmer DePaulis and
Marc B. Johnson

Kevin A. Howard, Esq.
Gregory D. Phillips, Esq.
Daniel D. Andersen, Esq.
David B. Hansen, Esq.
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Attorneys for Appellate,
Utah State Retirement System

Gary A. Dodge (0897)
Kevin W. Bates (4793)
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City Utah, 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6363
Salt Lake City, Utah 841140874
Attorneys for Appellants

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Richard C. Thompson and Paul C.
Jensen on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated taxpayers,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 20030506-SC

The Utah State Tax Commission, Pam
Hendrickson, R. Bruce Johnson, Palmer
DePaulis, and Marc B. Johnson, as
Commissioners of the Utah State Tax
Commission and the Utah State
Retirement System,

Defendants and Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING
John C. McCarrey, Esq.
Timothy A. Bodily, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff, Esq.
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140874
Attorneys for Appellees,
Utah State Tax Commission,
Pam Hendrickson, R. Bruce
Johnson Palmer DePaulis and
Marc B. Johnson

Kevin A. Howard, Esq.
Gregory D. Phillips, Esq.
Daniel D. Andersen, Esq.
David B. Hansen, Esq.
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Attorneys for Appellate,
Utah State Retirement System

Gary A. Dodge (0897)
Kevin W. Bates (4793)
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City Utah, 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6363
Salt Lake City, Utah 841140874
Attorneys for Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

ARGUMENT

4

I.

INTRODUCTION

4

II.

UTAH'S DISCRIMINATORY TAX
REBATE SYSTEM VIOLATES THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

5

A. Davis Does Not Condone Substituting a Tax
Rebate for a Discriminatory Tax Exemption

5

B. An Increase in Benefits Granted Only to
State Retirees Who Lost the Unconstitutional
Tax Exemption as a Result of Davis is a Tax Rebate

8

1.

2.

3.

CONCLUSION

The Court Should Look at all
Relevant Circumstances Surrounding
the Increased Pension Benefits to Determine
Whether They are in Effect Tax Rebates

8

The Factors Cited by the Ragsdale Court
are not Determinative of Whether the
Utah Pension Increase is a Tax Rebate

10

The Vogel and Sheehy Decisions Demonstrate
that the Challenged Pension Increase is a Rebate...

12
15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page

Ammeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation,
53 Va. Cir. 429, 2000 WL 1687589 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury,
489 U.S. 803 (1989)
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board,
770 P.2d 93, 96 (Utah 1988)

6

4, 7

15

Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue,
895 P.2d 1348 (Ore. 1995)

9, 12

Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Division,
864 P.2d 762, 768 (Mont. 1993)

8

Shiflet v. Eller,
319S.E.2d750

7

Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Health Care,
990 P.2d 384 (Utah 1999)

7

Town of South Hill v. Allen,
12 S.E.2d 770, 775 (Va. 1941)

7

Vogl v. Department of Revenue,
960 P.2d 373, 379 (Or. 1998)

8, 14, 15

Ward v. State,
2003 WL 22889005, — S.E.2d — (SC December 8,2003)

6,7

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
512 U.S. 186,199,201(1994)

7

STATUTES
4U.S.C. §111

6

Utah Code Ann. §49-1-701

11,16

3

Appellants Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen, on behalf of themselves and
all other similarly situated taxpayers (collectively "Taxpayers"), through their counsel
hereby respectfully submit this Appellants' Reply Brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
The Briefs filed in this docket by the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax

Commission") and the Utah State Retirement Board ("Retirement Board") urge this
Court to exalt form over substance in order to condone continued state-sanctioned tax
discrimination against federal retirees.

The Taxpayers respectfully submit that the

arguments advanced by the Tax Commission and Retirement Board cannot survive
reasoned analysis.
It has been settled for nearly 15 years that a state may not discriminate against
federal retirees by granting a tax exemption for state retirement income but not for federal
retirement income. Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). It
necessarily follows that unlawful discrimination is not cured if a state eliminates the
discriminatory tax exemption but replaces it with a rebate of some or all of the taxes paid
on state retirement income. It also logically follows that the unlawful discriminatory
result is not cured if the tax rebate is granted in the form of increased state retirement
benefits. In a constitutional analysis, substance prevails over form. The State of Utah

4

cannot lawfully discriminate against federal retirees based on source of income, whether
the discrimination takes the form of a tax exemption, a tax rebate or a targeted increase in
retirement benefits, if the intent is to replace all or part of the economic value of an
unconstitutional tax exemption.
It is undisputed that the State of Utah granted a targeted increase in state
retirement benefits to those state retirees who had lost the economic benefits of a
discriminatory tax exemption rendered unlawful by Davis.

The State admittedly

increased these benefits for the express purpose of replacing (or rebating), at least in part,
the economic consequences of the unlawful tax exemption.

Taxpayers respectfully

submit that this Court would not accept a "form-over-substance" argument to condone
perpetuation of the economic consequences of unlawful discrimination in any other
context, such as employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex or religion. For the
same reason, the State of Utah cannot properly perpetuate the economic consequences of
its unlawful tax discrimination against federal retirees.
II.

UTAH'S DISCRIMINATORY TAX REBATE SYSTEM VIOLATES THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A. Davis Does Not Condone Substituting a Tax Rebate for a Discriminatory
Tax Exemption.
The Retirement Board and the Tax Commission both argue that Utah's scheme of

eliminating the tax exemption on state retirees while simultaneously providing a rebate of
the taxes so imposed complies with the United States Supreme Court's mandate in Davis.
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According to the Appellees' logic, no payment to state retirees could ever violate the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity as expressed in the United States
Constitution and 4 U.S.C. §111, even if it were a direct rebate of all taxes incurred as a
result of a state's repeal of a discriminatory tax exemption. In support of their argument,
Appellees rely on a footnote in Davis, on a trial court ruling from Virginia, Almeter v.
Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000), cert, refused, No. 010270, Va.
(April 20 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 889, 122 S.Ct. 202 (mem) (Oct. 1, 2001), and
presumably on a recent decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, Ward v. State,
2003 WL 22889005, — S.E.2d — (SC December 8, 2003).

Appellees' position is not

supported by Davis or by sound logic.
Footnote 4 of Davis does not lend Appellees the support they claim. As noted in
Taxpayers' opening brief, footnote 4 of Davis contains dicta responding to an objection
raised in the dissent. It certainly does not purport to establish that discriminatory taxation
can be cured by replacing an unlawful tax exemption with a rebate.1 Presumably, the
1

Based on footnote 4, Appellees suggest that the primary rationale behind the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity is protection of the federal treasury. Impacts on the federal
treasury are mentioned in footnote 4 of the Davis opinion in response to one of the concerns
raised by the dissent, but only to illustrate a potential adverse impact of the discriminatory tax
exemption at issue. Neither the specific language of footnote 4 nor the rationale for the Davis
opinion in whole suggests in any manner that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
exists primarily to protect the federal treasury. Moreover, such an argument is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's explicit recognition in Davis that one way to comply with the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine is by simply eliminating the tax exemption for state
retirement income. Federal tax collections would decrease upon elimination of a state tax
exemption. State taxes, which would increase as a result of the lost exemption, can be deducted
from federal taxable income for taxpayers who itemize, thus decreasing federal tax collections.
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Davis majority did not forsee that some states might attempt to evade the ruling by
replacing the economic consequences of an unlawful tax exemption with a tax rebate.
Discrimination that is unlawful in substance cannot be condoned even if it appears proper
in form; unlawful discrimination is prohibited "whether forthright or ingenious." West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199, 201 (1994).
Similarly, Almeter is of little aid to Appellees. In the first place, Almeter is not
even controlling authority in Virginia.

Since it is not authority in Virginia, it is not

authority upon which the courts of Utah should rely. Moreover, the Almeter decision is
not persuasive. See Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Health Care, 990 P.2d 384, 387 (Utah
1999) (not relying on foreign cases that are unpersuasive). Almeter reflects a flippant
evasion of the constitutional requirement of non-discrimination as articulated in Davis.
Similarly unpersuasive is the recent decision of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, Ward v. State, 2003 WL 22889005, — S.E.2d — (SC December 8, 2003),
which was decided (and submitted by Appellees to this Court) after the initial briefs had
been filed. Ward affirmed a lower court determination that an increase in retirement
There is simply nothing to suggest that potential impacts on the federal treasury were driving
factors in Davis.
2

The Virginia Supreme Court refused to grant a petition for leave to appeal a lower court's
order, which sustained the state's demurrer on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
cause of action under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity and 4 U.S.C. §111. Such
a denial of leave to appeal is not controlling authority under Virginia law. Shiflet v. Eller, 319
S.E.2d 750, 755, n.2 (Va. 1984), citing County of Brunswick v. Peebles & Purdy Co., 122 S.E.
424, 430 (Va. 1924); Town of South Hill v. Allen, 12 S.E.2d 770, 775 (Va. 1941).
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benefits designed to compensate for additional taxes resulting from repeal of a tax
exemption rendered unconstitutional by Davis did not violate the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity.

Like Appellees in this case, the Ward court read

footnote 4 of the Davis opinion to support its conclusion that a state has an absolute right
to determine compensation for its employees "even if the state's purpose is to
compensate its employees for the loss of the [unconstitutional] income tax exemption."
Id. at 3.

Taxpayers respectfully submit that the South Carolina Supreme Court

misunderstood and misapplied Davis, gave inadequate deference to the United States
Constitution, and relied upon logic that is unsupportable and unpersuasive. Taxpayers
submit that the appropriate constitutional analysis under these conditions is the careful
and reasoned analysis applied by the Supreme Courts of Oregon and Montana in Sheehy
v. Public Employees Retirement Division, 864 P.2d 762, 768 (Mont. 1993) and Vogl v.
Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373, 379 (Or. 1998).
B. An Increase in Benefits Granted Only to State Retirees Who Lost the
Unconstitutional Tax Exemption as a Result of Davis is a Tax Rebate.
1. The Court Should Look at all Relevant Circumstances Surrounding the
Increased Pension Benefits to Determine Whether they are in Effect Tax
Rebates.
The Appellees argue in the alternative that, even if Davis does not exempt all tax
rebates from the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, the particular retiree
payments at issue in this case should not be regarded as tax rebates. In advancing this
argument, Appellees identify and distinguish certain specific "factors" analyzed by the
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Courts in Sheehy, Vogl and Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Ore.
1995).

As demonstrated in Taxpayer's principal brief, by using this approach the

Appellees are able to set up and dismiss purportedly controlling "straw men" factors.
This approach ignores the principal lesson of Sheehy, Vogl and Ragsdale, i.e., a court
should look to all relevant circumstances relating to the challenged legislative enactment
in order to determine whether increased pension benefits were intended as a rebate of
taxes caused by the loss of a discriminatory and unlawful tax exemption. The courts in
those cases examined all applicable circumstances in an effort to determine whether the
legislature was attempting to rebate taxes as a means of perpetuating the economic
consequences of an impermissible taxation scheme in another form.
Missing the critical lesson of these cases, the Tax Commission and the Retirement
Board simply ignore the numerous factors outlined in the Taxpayers' opening brief that
conclusively demonstrate that Utah granted, in substance and effect, a tax rebate to
perpetuate the economic impacts of the taxing scheme outlawed by Davis. Instead, the
Tax Commission and Retirement Board attempt to contort and distinguish the specific
factors examined in Ragsdale, Vogl and Sheehy. Even if one were to ignore the principal
lesson of these cases and focus solely on the specific factors discussed, however, these
factors support the Taxpayers' claims when properly viewed.
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2. The Factors Cited by the Ragsdale Court are not Determinative of
Whether the Utah Pension Increase is a Tax Rebate.
The Tax Commission purports to rely for its position on "four points of reasoning
...in Ragsdale." Tax Commission Brief at 20. The Tax Commission first asserts that
"Utah law complies expressly with the requirements of the United States Supreme
Court's Davis decision." Id. The Tax Commission's statement is, however, tautological.
The question placed squarely before this Court is whether Utah law complies with the
requirements of Davis or whether it constitutes an improper scheme to avoid the
requirements of Davis. The Tax Commission's statement thus assumes the conclusion
and is meaningless.
The Tax Commission next quotes the Ragsdale court as saying that Davis is
indifferent to the level of compensation that a state pays its retirees.

While that

conclusion is undoubtedly true in the abstract, it cannot, as suggested by the Tax
Commission, create blanket immunity for a state to use retirement compensation as a
mean to accomplish unlawful discrimination under the circumstances of this case.
Indeed, the same court that decided Ragsdale clearly recognized this fact, because its
Vogl decision declined to adopt the "total immunity" concept urged by the Tax
Commission.

When read together, Vogl and Ragsdale demonstrate that Davis is

indifferent to the level of compensation paid by a state to its retirees so long as payments
are not disguised tax rebates designed to perpetuate a violation of the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity.
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The Tax Commission claims that the Taxpayers have "cited no statutory language
showing that there is a link between the pension benefit received by a state retiree and the
amount of Utah State income taxes paid by a retiree." Tax Commission Brief at 21. In
fact, the supposedly missing link suggested by the Tax Commission is provided by the
language of the statute that created the 3% rebate. Utah Code § 49-1-701 explicitly links
the benefit to the amount of Utah State income taxes because the benefit increase was
granted only to those members of the retirement system who lost the unlawful state
income tax exemption. An explicit link thus exists between the amount of taxes paid by a
retiree and the pension benefit.

The benefit is paid only to those retirees who pay

increased taxes as a result of the lost tax exemption.3
Finally, the Tax Commission asserts that the Ragsdale court found one provision
of the challenged Oregon law - which prohibited additional payments in a year in which
retirement benefits were exempt from Oregon income tax - more troubling than the
others. However, the Ragsdale opinion does not suggest that this provision was any more
problematic than any other. Rather, in weighing all of the relevant circumstances the
court noted that "the provision to end the payments if state taxation ends points towards a

3

The Tax Commission also asserts that the rebate at issue is not part of the taxation system of
Utah "due to its source of funding." There is no factual basis on the record in support of this
questionable assertion. Indeed, the Retirement Board's Brief suggests that the rebate is funded
by taxes used to fund the salary and benefits of state employees. See Retirement Board Brief at
6.
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tax rebate." Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1354. The court determined that several other factors
pointed away from the idea that the increase was a tax rebate.
The Ragsdale court noted the obvious fact that a specific link between a pension
payment and the repealed exemption suggests a tax rebate. The Retirement Board has
acknowledged a similar linkage in Utah, i.e., the increased Utah payment is a "substantial
substitute" for the elimination of a vested right (the right to a state income tax
exemption).

Record at 131. Thus, while the identical language examined by the

Ragsdale court is not present in the Utah statute, a similar linkage is present.4
3. The Vogl and Sheehy Decisions Demonstrate that the Challenged
Pension Increase is a Rebate.
As explained in detail in the Taxpayer's initial brief, the Supreme Courts of
Oregon and Montana rejected legislation designed to rebate or replace economic
consequences of the discriminatory tax exemption declared unlawful by Davis. The Tax
Commission's attempt to distinguish Vogl and Sheehy is unavailing. For example, the
Tax Commission contends that the Utah statute "contains no requirement that a retiree be
a Utah taxpayer to qualify for the pension increase." Tax Commission Brief at 24. While
the Utah statute contains no such express language, the fact is that a retiree from the Utah

4

The Appellees also miss an important point of difference between the Utah scheme and the
Oregon statute evaluated in Ragsdale, Under the Oregon statute evaluated in Ragsdale, some
retirees who lost their state income tax exemption did not receive any increase in retirement
benefits, which pointed away from a rebate. Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1354. The same is not true in
Utah. Under the Utah statute, every member of the retirement system who lost the tax exemption
receives the statutory increase.
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State Retirement System will pay Utah State taxes on that retirement income. As a
practical matter, any member of the Retirement System who actually receives the 3%
increase will thus be a Utah taxpayer.
The Tax Commission also contends that the Utah statute "provides for a new basis
in the retirement allowance, irrespective of any past...tax rate changes."

Tax

Commission Brief at 25. In fact, however, the new basis is provided only to those
members of the system who lost their tax exemptions and, therefore, experienced a
dramatic increase in their tax rate.
Similarly, the Tax Commission points out that the Utah statute "lacks language
stating that it is part of a claim of settlement for state retirees." Id. The Retirement
Board, however, has acknowledged that the increase was provided as a "substantial
substitute" for the tax exemption, a vested right that was taken away. Record at 131. The
pension increase was thus intended as an advance settlement payment, perhaps in an
effort to forestall claims by state retirees.
The Tax Commission and the Retirement Board rely on the same two factors
addressed by the lower court in an effort to distinguish Sheehy, but in doing so wholly
miss the important lesson of Sheehy. The relevance of Sheehy to this case is not found in
the specific factors that were analyzed by the court in arriving at its decision, but rather in
the fact that the Sheehy court examined all of the relevant circumstances in an effort to
determine the actual import and intent of the challenged statute. The Tax Commission
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wholly fails to address this fact, perhaps because it wishes to maintain as much distance
as possible from any discussion of the actual import and intent of the Utah statute. The
Utah statute was clearly intended to replace at least a portion of the economic detriment
resulting from the loss of the unconstitutional and discriminatory tax exemption. As in
Sheehy, once that intent and import become clear, the statute cannot stand.
The Tax Commission makes a similar attempt to distinguish specific factors
analyzed by the court in Vogl, again missing the point of the Vogl analysis - to determine
the intent and import of the statute. The Tax Commission's arguments as to the relevance
of specific factors examined in Vogl were addressed in the Taxpayers' initial brief, and
will not be repeated here. However, the Tax Commission is simply incorrect in claiming
that the Utah statute can be distinguished from the statute at issue in Vogl on the grounds
that the Oregon legislation was intended as compensation for the retirees' loss of their tax
exemption. As explained above, the Retirement Board has acknowledged that the Utah
legislation was intended as a substantial substitute for a vested right that was eliminated.
The Vogl court noted that "[t]he legislature's designation of the increase as legal
compensation shows...that it is not a mere benefit increase." It also noted that "[t]he
increase purports to give PERS retirees what they were promised, v/z., tax-free retirement
benefits." Vogl v. Dep't. of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373, 380, 379-80 (Or. 1998). Similarly,
the Utah legislation purports to give Utah State retirees at least a portion of what they
were promised, vzz., tax-free retirement benefits. As conceded by the Retirement Board,

14

"[t]here can be no legislative...elimination of vested...pension rights...unless a
substantial substitute is granted in place of the elimination of benefits."

Retirement

Board Brief at 19. To paraphrase Vogl, the pension increase, as a substantial substitute
for the discriminatory tax exemption, was the "cure" to the imposition of the income tax,
and a cure for being overtaxed is a rebate. See Vogl, 960 P.2d at 379-80.
In order to be a "substantial substitute," the retirement increase would need to be
in an amount necessary in the eyes of the law to make the retirees whole. Johnson v.
Utah State Retirement Board, 110 P.2d 93, 96 (Utah 1988) ("A substantial substitute for
affected pension rights requires more than merely providing an 'adequate' retirement
system in place of an existing agreement; the substitute plan must not adversely affect the
employee's vested rights.") Thus, "[t]he relationship between the lost exemption and
the...increase...is not merely one of logical causation...but of purported legal
equivalence." Vogl, 960 P.2d 381. If it were not legally equivalent - that is, sufficient to
make the retirees whole - it would not be a substantial substitute.
CONCLUSION
Many state legislators and courts have grappled with the implications of Davis and
its progeny, and the reactions have not been uniform. The issues are admittedly not easy
to resolve. One the one hand, states have an undisputed right to establish state tax
policies and to determine salaries and benefits for state employees. On the other hand,
the United States Constitution demands that states not use tax policies or benefits in a
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manner that results in tax discrimination against federal retirees based on source of
income. The tax exemptions granted by many states prior to 1989 for state (but not
federal) retirement income crossed that constitutional line. It follows that anything done
by a state for the express purpose of perpetuating the prohibited economic consequences
of such an unconstitutional tax exemption must necessarily be rejected, lest the
Constitution be trivialized.
The express intent and actual effect of the Utah Legislature in adopting Utah Code
Ann. § 49-1-701 was to replace for affected state retirees a portion of the additional taxes
they incurred by the repeal of the unconstitutional tax exemption. A facial review of the
statute, and particularly when considered in the context of all relevant circumstances,
compels the conclusion that this selective increase in pension benefits was intended to be,
and became, a rebate of a substantial portion of the taxes collected as a result of the lost
tax exemption. A discriminatory tax rebate is no more lawful than a discriminatory tax
exemption.
The Courts of last resort of Oregon and Montana, after determining based on all
relevant circumstances that the intent and impact of the statutory schemes at issue in
those cases were the equivalent of a rebate of taxes collected as a result of the lost
exemption, properly rejected the challenged schemes. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina reached a contrary result, apparently concluding that a state can nullify
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constitutional anti-discrimination protections simply by changing the form. Taxpayers
respectfully submit that constitutional rights cannot properly be so easily evaded.
This Court need not concern itself with whether the State of Utah could have
gotten away with rebating taxes resulting from repeal of the discriminatory tax exemption
had it attempted to disguise its true intent, as some states did. To its credit, the State of
Utah was forthright in its stated intent. It intended to substantially replace the economic
consequences of the repealed tax exemption by increasing benefits for affected state
retirees. The intent is clear, and even understandable and laudable. The result, however,
is unconstitutional. Substance prevails over form. Discriminatory tax treatment cannot
be perpetuated simply by changing its form. Taxpayers respectfully submit that the lower
court's ruling granting Appellees' Motion to Dismiss should be reversed and the matter
should be remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?J*

day of January, 2004.

HATCH, JAMES & DODGE

By:

.
Gary A. Dodge
Kevin W. Bates
Attorneys for Appellants
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